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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After the district court denied his motion to suppress, a jury convicted David Nelson of
one count of possession of methamphetamine, and Mr. Nelson pled guilty to the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. In denying Mr. Nelson’s motion to suppress, the district court
agreed with the State that Mr. Nelson did not have standing to challenge the search by way of the
curtilage of his friend’s home, because Mr. Nelson had waived his rights to be free from
unconstitutional searches by initialing an Agreement of Supervision as part of his parole process.
On appeal, Mr. Nelson asserts that the State did not meet its burden of proving a valid agreement
of supervision was in effect when the unlawful search occurred, or that the search of the
apartment was permissible pursuant to Mr. Nelson’s consent to the Fourth Amendment waiver
provision. Further, Mr. Nelson was an overnight guest, and thus had an expectation of privacy in
the residence which was viewed unlawfully from the apartment’s curtilage. The remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation is suppression, and the district court should have suppressed the
evidence found in the home.
The district court also erred in denying Mr. Nelson’s motion for appointment of conflict
counsel, where the court failed to provide Mr. Nelson with a full and fair opportunity to explain
the problems he was having with his counsel so that the court could determine if the attorneyclient relationship was irretrievably broken.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 11, 2016, at approximately 7 o’clock in the evening, Officer Doerr stood in a
blocked off alleyway outside an apartment building and watched the occupants of a woman’s
bedroom through the window. (Tr., p.85, L.8 – p.87, L.3, p.90, L.25 – p.94, L.11; Defendant’s
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Trial Exhibits A, B, C.) While peeping into her bedroom, Officer Doerr saw the woman lying on
the bed and a man’s back, and he appeared to be moving a glass pipe typically used to ingest
controlled substances. (Tr., p.87, Ls.3-5; p.92, L.17 - p.95, L.23, p.102, Ls.9-13.) Eventually,
the occupants of the bedroom noticed Officer Doerr peering in the window and the man turned
around and set the pipe on a nightstand. (Tr., p.88, Ls.12-21.) He was identified as David
Nelson, a person who was on parole, after another officer stopped him as he left the apartment.
(Tr., p.87, Ls.24-25; p.88, Ls.22-25, p.103, Ls.1-23.) After a consensual search of the woman’s
nightstand, a pipe containing methamphetamine residue was located. (Tr., p.89, Ls.10-20; p.117,
Ls.7-9, p.120, Ls.5-7.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information which alleged that Mr. Nelson
possessed methamphetamine, and had two or more prior felony convictions and so was therefore
a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.38-40, 44-47, 76-79.) Thereafter, Mr. Nelson filed a
Motion to Suppress. (R., pp.83-84.) He asserted that the evidence gathered against him should
be suppressed, because the officer’s entry onto the curtilage of the residence to peer through the
window was unlawful. (R., pp.83-84.)
At the hearing on Mr. Nelson’s motion to suppress, Mr. Nelson testified that he had
previously stayed overnight at the apartment on five or six occasions. (Tr., p.7, Ls.8-12.) He
testified that he did not stay the night of August 10, 2016, however. (Tr., p.7, Ls.13-15.) The
State introduced an Idaho Department of Correction Agreement of Supervision that provided, in
part:
5. Search: I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for
which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC or a law
enforcement officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and
the Idaho constitution concerning searches.
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(State’s Exhibit 1.) Mr. Nelson testified that he had signed the Agreement. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-12.)
Defense counsel argued that Mr. Nelson had standing to challenge the search because he was an
overnight guest. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-9.) The State argued that Mr. Nelson did not have standing to
make the motion, and even if he did, he waived his Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to the
parole agreement. (Tr., p.10, Ls.11-17.)
The district court recognized that overnight guests do have an expectation of privacy in
certain circumstances, but found Mr. Nelson had no standing to challenge the search because he
had waived his Fourth Amendment rights. (Tr., p.11, Ls.10-22.) The district court found that,
even assuming that Mr. Nelson would otherwise have standing as an overnight guest, he had
waived his rights to be free from search and seizure as a condition of his parole. (Tr., p.11, L.18
– p.12, L.11.) The district court ultimately denied Mr. Nelson’s motion to suppress for the
reasons stated on the record. (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-16; R., pp.90-91.)
At trial, Officer Doerr testified that he was not at the apartment to investigate Mr. Nelson.
(Tr., p.99, Ls.14-15.) He was there, peering in the window of Mr. Nelson’s friend’s apartment,
hoping to see evidence of Mr. Nelson’s friend using controlled substances. (Tr., p.86, Ls.13-22.)
The prior night, he had responded to a domestic violence call where Mr. Nelson’s friend was the
suspected victim. (Tr., p.86, Ls.4-18.) She denied there was a problem and claimed that she was
making the yelling and screaming and breaking noises and was alone in the apartment at the
time. (Tr., p.86, Ls.4-18.) However, Officer Doerr had observed a pipe with marijuana when
she allowed him in the apartment, and she also admitted that she used methamphetamine, so
Officer Doerr had returned to the apartment the next evening to surveil her activities through her
apartment window. (Tr., p.86, Ls.13-22.)
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After the trial, the jury convicted Mr. Nelson of one count of felony possession of a
controlled substance, and he pled guilty to a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(Tr., p.140, L.21 – p.141, L.4; p.142, Ls.18 – p.144, L.7; R., p.165.) Mr. Nelson moved the court
to appoint substitute counsel, but that request was denied after a hearing. (Tr., p.150, Ls.15-22;
p.156, Ls.3-5.) On February 6, 2017, the district sentenced Mr. Nelson to seven years of
incarceration, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.167, Ls.14-18; R., pp.189-194.) The court ordered
the sentence to be served consecutively to the Cassia County case number CR-2010-2375.
(Tr., p.167, Ls.17-18; R., p.191.) Mr. Nelson filed a Rule 35 motion seeking leniency because he
wished to regain custody of his son. (R., pp.201-205.) The district court denied Mr. Nelson’s
motion without a hearing. (R., pp.206-209.) On February 9, 2017, Mr. Nelson filed a Notice of
Appeal timely from the district court’s Order of Probation on Withheld Judgment. (R., pp.198200, 215-217, 225-231.)

4

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nelson’s motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nelson’s motion for substitute counsel?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nelson’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Nelson asserts that the court erred in finding that he waived his Fourth Amendment

rights in his supervision agreement, where the State failed to establish that the agreement was
valid and effective on the date of the search or that Mr. Nelson voluntarily consented to the
waiver of his rights. Further, Mr. Nelson’s privacy interest in the apartment, as an occasional
overnight guest, was violated when officers entered the curtilage of his friend’s apartment
without a search warrant.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated. An appellate court defers

to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and freely reviews
the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Hankey,
134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[s]tanding is an issue over which this court
exercises free review.” State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 936 (2010). “The issue of whether a party
has standing to assert a particular claim should be resolved before the merits of the claim are
reached.” Id.
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “This guarantee
has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
the states.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). “Evidence obtained in violation of the
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amendment generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal government
action.” Id. at 810-811. “This rule, known as the exclusionary rule, applies to evidence obtained
directly from the illegal government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation
of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. The
“physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed. . . .” State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 523 (1986) (quoting United States v. United
States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
“Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015)
(alteration in original).

“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively

unreasonable unless if falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.” Halen v.
State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). “When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the
defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement is applicable.” Id.
However, “[a] person challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or she had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place searched.” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623,
626 (2008) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho
649, 651 (1983)). “That involves a two-part inquiry: (1) Did the person have a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to
recognize that expectation as reasonable?” Id. (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211
(1986); State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 473 (2001)). As shorthand for this inquiry, courts often
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refer to whether a defendant has standing to challenge a search. 1 See, e.g., State v. Haworth, 106
Idaho 405, 407 n.2 (1984). An overnight guest in the house of another can carry “an expectation
of privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 479
(Ct. App. 2008).
In this case, the district court employed the following analysis to determine that
Mr. Nelson did not have standing to challenge the search:
[P]aragraph 5 of State’s Exhibit 1 is very clear that this defendant has waived his
Fourth Amendment rights with regard to search, and I’ll just read this into the
record: “I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property and other real property or structures owned or leased by me or for which
I am a controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC,” which is the
department of corrections [sic], “or a law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my
rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning
searches.”
The case of State v. Gawthron . . . is one of the very early Idaho cases that has
said that waivers like this that have been made are enforceable. What it simply
means is that assuming that Mr. Nelson would otherwise have standing as an
overnight guest, so I’m assuming that for purposes of making this ruling, he’s
waived that.
Therefore, he doesn’t have standing; therefore, the officer that conducted
whatever search or seizure was perfectly legal to do so. There’s no standing in
this case, there can be no constitutional violation. We need not go further.
Motion to suppress is denied.

1

The term “standing” is no longer a technically accurate way to describe the relevant inquiry in
this case as the United States Supreme Court has rejected the concept of “standing” insofar as
that concept implicates only procedural rules: “[I]n determining whether a defendant is able to
show the violation of his . . . Fourth Amendment rights, the ‘definition of those rights is more
properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of
standing.’” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 139-40 (1978)). Further, because the district court in this case said it was using the term
“standing” interchangeably with the phrase “the expectation of privacy” (Tr., p.11, Ls.10-12),
that term will also be used imprecisely by Mr. Nelson to describe the relevant inquiry in this
case.
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(Tr., p.11, L.18 – p.12, L.16.) However, the district court erred in holding that the parole
agreement deprived Mr. Nelson of standing to challenge the search.

C.

The Supervision Agreement Did Not Waive Mr. Nelson’s “Standing” To Challenge The
Search

1.

The State Failed To Establish The Existence Of A Valid, Enforceable Waiver
Provision

The State submitted as an exhibit at the suppression hearing a document that appears to
be a page from Mr. Nelson’s parole supervision agreement, and it contains language including a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure waiver. (State’s Exhibit 1.) Mr. Nelson testified that he
signed the document in March of 2016. (Tr., p.9, Ls.6-12.) Although that was the extent of the
testimony regarding any Fourth Amendment waiver, the district court found that paragraph 5
document waived Mr. Nelson “has waived his Fourth Amendment rights with regard to search.”
(Tr., p.11, Ls.20-22.) The district court erred in implicitly finding the Agreement of Supervision
was valid and effective on the date Officer Doerr peeked through the window.
At the hearing on Mr. Nelson’s motion to suppress, the State introduced a document
which appears to be a page from Mr. Nelson’s parole agreement, and which contains language
waiving his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Idaho Constitution concerning searches.
(State’s Exhibit 1.) Mr. Nelson testified that he signed the paper somewhere around March 8,
2016, before he was released from prison. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-12.) But there is no evidence that
particular probation agreement that was initialed by “DN” and admitted into evidence was still in
effect on August 11, 2016, when Mr. Nelson was arrested.
The district court found that Mr. Nelson waived his Fourth Amendment right to be free
from searches pursuant to a parole agreement; however, the exhibit was undated and incomplete.
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Nonetheless, the court relied on the document in holding that Mr. Nelson did not have standing
to challenge the search of the premises by way of the curtilage because he had waived his rights
under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho Constitution regarding searches. Cf., State v. Ellis,
155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013) (district court denied defendant’s motion to suppress,
concluding, inter alia, that he “waived his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches pursuant to a parole agreement and the parole agreement was still in effect when law
enforcement entered his apartment”).
Here, the court did not put the State to its burden, and the State did not meet its burden to
show that the waiver was valid and enforceable on the date of the search at issue.

2.

The State Failed To Meet Its Burden Of Proving The Language In The
Supervision Agreement Constituted A Valid Consent To Search

Mr. Nelson does not contest that a parolee may waive his Fourth Amendment rights by
consenting to a search. However, the State did not introduce sufficient evidence here to show
that Mr. Nelson’s supervision agreement constituted consent to a search. The State did not meet
its burden to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that Mr. Nelson voluntarily entered into the
agreement, thus, the district court’s finding that the existence of the waiver negated any further
analysis was error.
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant issued on
probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003)
(citations omitted). Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the warrant requirement,
however.

State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97

(Ct. App. 2006).
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“It is the State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent
was voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied.” Jaborra, 143 Idaho
at 97. This has also been described as “a heavy burden to prove that the consent was given freely
and voluntarily.” State v. Huskey, 106 Idaho 91, 94 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1968)). “A voluntary decision is one that is ‘the product of an
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.’ An individual’s consent is involuntary,
on the other hand, ‘if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired.’” Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 225 (1973)). The voluntariness of an individual’s consent—whether consent was granted
voluntarily or was a product of coercion—is a question of fact evaluated in light of all the
surrounding circumstances. State v. Santana, 162 Idaho 79, 394 P.3d 122, 127 (Ct. App. 2017).
Parolees and probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy, and courts will
enforce Fourth Amendment waivers as a condition of parole or probation. State v. Cruz, 144
Idaho 906, 908 (Ct. App. 2007). However, in order to enforce a Fourth Amendment waiver in a
probation agreement, the State must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the
waiver was a valid condition of the defendant’s probation; and (2) that the defendant voluntarily
consented to waive his right to the protections from warrantless seizures. Santana, 394 P.3d at
126-127. Similarly, the burden is on the State to establish that a parolee voluntarily consented to
waive his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and Idaho Constitution. See, e.g.,
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64 (1999) (“To be valid, a waiver of the right to counsel must
have been effected knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”); State v. Darymple, 144 Idaho
628, 633 (2007). (“[T]he State bears the burden to prove that the defendant voluntarily waived
his Sixth Amendment rights.”); State v. Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 130 (1983) (holding “that the
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State’s burden of proof that there was a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda
rights is to be established by a preponderance of the evidence”); see also Samson v. California,
547 U.S. 843, 850 n.2 (2006) (disavowing the proposition that parolees, like prisoners, have no
Fourth Amendment rights).
Here, the agreement initialed by Mr. Nelson provided in relevant part:
5. Search: I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for
which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC or a law
enforcement officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and
the Idaho constitution concerning searches.
(State’s Exhibit 1.) Because the waiver was so broad, and presumably Mr. Nelson, in order to be
released on parole, was required to “waive [his] rights under the Fourth Amendment and the
Idaho constitution concerning searches” (State’s Exhibit 1), the court must determine whether
such a waiver was voluntary. Here, we do not have any testimony of what the Agreement of
Supervision is, whether other documents or explanations accompanied it, the conditions under
which it was signed, or whether it was in effect on August 11, 2016. It would have been a
simple matter to have an officer testify regarding the parole terms and conditions, the substance
of the entire Agreement of Supervision and when it was signed, and the circumstances under
which Mr. Nelson had signed it. This the State did not do.
Recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in State v. Santana, 162 Idaho 79, 394 P.3d
122 (Ct. App. 2017), that the district court did not err in granting Santana’s motion to suppress
evidence of the search, because the consent rendered in Santana’s probation agreement was the
product of coercion. Id., 394 P.3d at 127. The Court held that Santana did not choose to waive
his Fourth Amendment rights, but rather signed the probation agreement because he believed
doing so was a condition of his probation. Id., 394 P.3d at 127. “Mere acquiescence to a claim of
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authority does not amount to consent.” Id., 394 P.3d at 127. In so holding, the Court of Appeals
also considered the fact that, when Mr. Santana was told to sign the probation agreement, he did
not have an attorney present and was not told that he had the right to have an attorney present.
Id., 394 P.3d at 127.
While Santana was a case involving probation, the circumstances of Mr. Nelson’s case
are so similar to the facts of Santana that the same result should follow. The court must
determine whether the consent was granted voluntarily, or whether it was the product of
coercion. Santana, 394 P.3d at 127. This is a question of fact to be determined in light of all the
surrounding circumstances. Id., 394 P.3d at 127.
In holding that Mr. Nelson lacked the ability to challenge the search because he had
waived that right in his parole agreement, the district court relied on State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho
841 (1987).2 In Gawron, officers searched the defendant's residence while he was not present
and found contraband and proceeds of burglaries. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the
search was authorized by the agreement because it was a complete waiver where the defendant
entered into the following agreement:
That probationer does hereby agree and consent to the search of his person,
automobile, real property, and any other property at any time and at any place by
any law enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation officer, and does waive
his constitutional right to be free from such searches.
Id. at 842. However, Gawron is distinguishable from the facts of Mr. Nelson’s case. In Gawron,
the Idaho Supreme Court found determinative that “That order indicated that Gawron had

2

The district court spelled out the name of the case as “State v. Gawthron” (Tr., p.12, Ls.5-8);
however, no such case exists that discusses the enforceability of a parole or probation waiver.
Mr. Nelson presumes that the court mistakenly spelled the name of the case, and intended to cite
to State v. Gawron, a case which dealt with a probationer’s waiver of his constitutional right to
be free from searches.
13

certified to a reading and understanding of the terms of the order, and that he accepted those
terms and signed the order.” Gawron, at 842.
While Gawron was a case in which the majority of the court found that the probationer
had waived his Fourth Amendment rights, thus, the search could not be challenged, the dissent
discussed concerns such as those set forth by the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Fogarty,
610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1980), where that court had before it a similar probation search condition:
Regardless of the condition imposed, if that is the sentencing court’s decision, the
probationer has little or no say in the matter. He can refuse to accept the
conditions imposed and go to prison, or he can accept the conditions and remain
in society subject to the State’s supervision for the probationary period. A waiver
theory however, does not comport with the requirements of Johnson v. Zerbst
(1938), 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, that a waiver is invalid
unless it be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. A choice cannot be
termed voluntary where the alternative is prison and even more restrictions.
Gawron, 112 Idaho at 844 (Bistline, J. dissenting) (quoting Fogarty, 610 P.2d at 147) (emphasis
added) (noting that a waiver theory is an improper justification for the probation conditions).
Here, the State failed to establish the validity of the waiver and that it was entered voluntarily. In
circumstances such as these, where the waiver is unlimited, the court must hold the State to its
burden before finding the parolee unequivocally waived his constitutional rights concerning
searches.
Because the State did not meet its burden of establishing that the warrantless search and
seizure of Mr. Nelson either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement
or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances, the evidence discovered on Mr. Nelson
following his illegal search and seizure should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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D.

Mr. Nelson Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The Place Searched
Assuming this Court finds Mr. Nelson did not waive his rights under the Fourth

Amendment and Idaho constitution concerning searches, Mr. Nelson asserts that, as an
occasional overnight guest, he had a privacy expectation in the place searched.

Where

Mr. Nelson testified at the hearing on his motion to suppress that he had stayed the night at the
apartment “at least five or six times” before, although he had not stayed the night on August 10,
2016, he qualified as an overnight guest.3 (Tr., p.7, Ls.8-15.) He thus had a privacy interest in
the apartment and could challenge the unlawful search by way of the curtilage.
Application of the constitutional safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures
initially depends on whether the person invoking protection had a justifiable, reasonable, or
legitimate expectation of privacy that was invaded by some governmental action. Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). The defendant bears the burden of proving that he or
she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. See State v. Spencer, 139
Idaho 736, 739 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246, 251 (Ct. App. 2003).
Minnesota v.

Olson,

495

U.S.

91,

98-100

(1990)

(holding

that

there

may

be some instances, such as when a defendant is an overnight guest, in which a defendant may
challenge the search of property owned or controlled by a third party). Normally persons
without standing are casual guests or visitors to a home who are merely present with the consent
of the homeowner. The United States Supreme Court has held that overnight guests or persons
who stay overnight at the host’s home on prior occasions but not necessarily on the date of the
warrantless entry can have standing to challenge an unwarranted search. See Olson, 495 U.S. at

3

Mr. Nelson was carrying a backpack when he was stopped; however, there was no testimony as
to whether he was planning to stay overnight at the apartment that night. (Tr., p.98, Ls.22-25.)
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99-100 (holding that Olson, as a person who had on one previous occasion stayed the night but
who was never left alone in the duplex or given a key, could claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960) (Jones had been given use of the
apartment by a friend, and had slept there one night in the past, but was the sole occupant of the
apartment at the time); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (telephone booth was “a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’
expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable”) but c.f., Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128 (1978) (reaffirming the factual holding of Jones, but rejecting the Jones Court’s
“legitimately on premises” evaluation). Idaho courts have recognized that an overnight guest can
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host’s home. See State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152,
154 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy where Benson was an
overnight guest on prior occasions and particularly on the night of his arrest); see also United
States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even an overnight houseguest
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence). While the Idaho appellate courts have
not specifically addressed this situation, where Mr. Nelson had spent the night on multiple
occasions, but did not spend the night the night before the search, United States Supreme Court
law indicates that Mr. Nelson did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home of his
friend.
Here, Mr. Nelson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where he had
previously stayed the night on multiple occasions. Mr. Nelson had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the apartment, and the warrantless search violated his constitutional rights.

16

While not addressed by the district court because it determined that its inquiry ceased
once it found Mr. Nelson lacked standing to challenge the search of his friend’s apartment, the
curtilage of a home is a protected space.
In Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), the United States Supreme Court held that the
warrantless use of a drug dog to search the curtilage of the defendant’s home violated the Fourth
Amendment. In that case, police officers suspected the defendant was growing marijuana. Id. at
3. Without a search warrant, the police officers approached the defendant’s home with a dog
trained to detect the scent of marijuana and other drugs. Id. The dog alerted to the presence of
illegal drugs while on the defendant’s front porch, and a subsequent search pursuant to a warrant
revealed marijuana plants. Id. The defendant was arrested and moved to suppress the marijuana
plants on the basis that the dog’s sniff on his front porch was an unreasonable search. Id.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by holding that the Fourth Amendment
“establishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history formed the exclusive basis for its
protections: When ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons,
houses, papers, or effects, ‘a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has
‘undoubtedly occurred.’” Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406-407
(2012)).

The Court first asked whether the police physically occupied a constitutionally

protected area. Id. at 5. The Court held that the police officers did in fact physically occupy a
constitutionally protected area, because the defendant’s porch is considered curtilage which is
deemed to be part of a person’s house. Id. at 6-7. The next question for the Court is whether the
physical occupation of the defendant’s porch was “accomplished through an unlicensed physical
intrusion.” Id. at 7. While the Court noted that generally there is an implicit license for the
police to approach a home and knock on the front door, there is no implicit license for the police
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to introduce “a trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering
incriminating evidence is something else. There is no customary invitation to do that.” Id. at 8-9
(emphasis in original). The Jardines Court concluded that the warrantless use of a drug dog to
search the curtilage of the defendant’s home violated the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, the first question is whether the area physically occupied by the government is a
constitutionally protected area, i.e., a person’s house, papers, or effects. The second question is
whether the physical occupation of the constitutionally protected area was “accomplished
through an unlicensed physical intrusion.” Id. at 7. This property-based approach focuses on
the area that the government is occupying and not on the area observed. In other words, the
focus of the inquiry is not where a police officer is looking; the focus of the inquiry is where the
police officer is standing or what the officer is touching at the time the officer makes an
observation.
Here, the officers were standing in a fenced-off alley, peering in the window of an
apartment on the first floor. The alleyway they were standing in was blocked to the public by
means of a chain-link fence. (Defendant’s Trial Exhibits A, B, C.) Officer Doerr, in order to see
into the woman’s bedroom, had to stand up against the window air conditioner and peer through
a break in the blinds. (Tr., p.92, L.17 – p.94, L.11.) Simply because a person resides in an
apartment does not mean they lose their privacy entirely. In fact, Officer Doerr’s conduct
appears to fall squarely within this State’s “peeping tom” law, which makes it a misdemeanor for
any person to go upon the private property of another “to intentionally look, peer or peek” into
the window of any inhabited building. 4 I.C. § 18-7006.

4

Idaho Code Section 18-7006, governing a trespass of privacy, provides:
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By standing in the curtilage of the apartment in order to peek into the apartment to view
Mr. Nelson and his female friend in her bedroom, Officer Doerr encroached upon a
constitutionally protected area.

The State did not meet its burden of establishing that an

exception to the warrant requirement applied or that the search by means of the curtilage of the
apartment in which Mr. Nelson had previously stayed as an overnight guest was otherwise
reasonable. The State did not meet its burden of establishing that an exception to the warrant
requirement applied or that the search by means of the curtilage of the apartment in which
Mr. Nelson had previously stayed as an overnight guest was otherwise reasonable. Any evidence
gleaned from this unconstitutional encroachment should have been suppressed.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of Mr. Nelson And
His Trial Counsel Upon Mr. Nelson’s Request For Substitute Counsel Thereby Depriving Him
Of His Right To Counsel Protected By The Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments Of The United
States Constitution As Well As Article I, § 13 Of The Idaho Constitution

A.

Introduction
Although the district court inquired of Mr. Nelson and his counsel regarding some of the

issues Mr. Nelson was having with his counsel, it did not question Mr. Nelson or his counsel as
to the specifics of Mr. Nelson’s claims that his counsel did not fully investigate in his case and
that there was “a complete breakdown in communication.”

The court was remiss in its

obligation to inquire further of Mr. Nelson and his counsel regarding these circumstances

It shall be unlawful for any person, upon the private property of another, to
intentionally look, peer or peek in the door, window, or other transparent opening
of any inhabited building or other structure located thereon, without visible or
lawful purpose. Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
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potentially demonstrating that the attorney-client relationship was irretrievably broken. This
failure to provide Mr. Nelson with a full and fair opportunity to present the facts in support of his
request for substitute counsel deprived him of his right to counsel protected by both the federal
and Idaho Constitutions. As such, Mr. Nelson’s case must be remanded to the district court in
order for the court to conduct the constitutionally mandated hearing to determine whether good
cause exists for the appointment of substitute counsel and for any further proceedings that may
be necessary as a result of the trial court’s determination.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
When the defendant objects to a conflict of interest at trial, the court has an affirmative

duty to inquire into the potential conflict. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704 (2009). If the
trial court fails to conduct an adequate inquiry, the defendant's conviction must be reversed
regardless of whether the conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance.

Id.

The

adequacy of a trial court's inquiry is a constitutional issue over which the courts exercise free
review. Id.
Both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Art. I,
§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel for criminal defendants. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456 (1967); State v. Lippert, 145
Idaho 586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). The right of an indigent defendant to counsel encompasses the
right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897 (1980). Regardless
of whether counsel is retained or appointed, a criminal defendant has a right to conflict-free
counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980). However, the right to counsel does not
necessarily encompass the right to counsel of one’s own choosing. Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594.
“Mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for
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substitute counsel in absence of extraordinary circumstances.” Id. A trial court has discretion to
appoint substitute counsel for good cause. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 897; State v. Peck, 130 Idaho
711, 713 (Ct. App. 1997). This Court reviews the district court’s determination as to whether to
appoint substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-715
(2002).
Where a defendant requests substitute counsel, the district court is under no obligation to
affirmatively act as an advocate for the defendant in determining whether to appoint substitute
counsel. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898. But the court nevertheless must afford the defendant a full
and fair hearing on the request for substitute counsel. Id. This is the case even where the trial
court maintains some initial skepticism as to the basis for the defendant’s request. As was noted
by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Peck, “even well-founded suspicions of intentional
delay and manipulative tactics can provide no substitute for the inquiries necessary to protect a
defendant’s constitutional rights.” 130 Idaho 711, 714 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting United States v.
Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 189 (3rd Cir. 1982)).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Conduct A Sufficient Inquiry Of Mr. Nelson
And His Counsel Upon Mr. Nelson’s Request For Appointment Of Substitute Counsel
After trial but before sentencing, Mr. Nelson filed a Request for Removal of Court

Appointed Attorney Tim Williams, and Appoint Replacement Conflict Attorney. (R., pp.180182.) Mr. Nelson alleged that his counsel: (1) was not competent where at trial he failed to
address facts relevant to whether Mr. Nelson possessed a controlled substance; (2) failed to
request audio recordings and provide Mr. Nelson with transcripts and failed to have the
paraphernalia fingerprinted before trial; (3) was not sufficiently diligent in investigating the facts
of his case; and (4) failed to communicate with Mr. Nelson in that he answered only 5% of the
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communication Mr. Nelson made to his office which constituted “a complete breakdown in
communication.” (R., pp.180-181.) However, the district court did not question Mr. Nelson or
his counsel as to the specifics of Mr. Nelson’s claims that his counsel did not fully investigate in
his case and that there was “a complete breakdown in communication.” The court was remiss in
its obligation to inquire further of Mr. Nelson and his counsel regarding these circumstances
potentially demonstrating that the attorney-client relationship was irretrievably broken. This
failure to provide Mr. Herrera with a full and fair opportunity to present the facts in support of
the two reasons for his request for substitute counsel deprived him of his right to counsel
protected by both the federal and Idaho Constitutions.
Post-trial, but prior to his sentencing hearing, Mr. Nelson filed a written motion asking
the district court to appoint conflict counsel to represent him. (R., pp.180-182.) The court set a
hearing, during which the district court advised Mr. Nelson that it had read Mr. Nelson’s letter,
and told him it would hear what he had to say. (Tr., p.151, Ls.10-13.) Mr. Nelson went through
some of the concerns he had identified in his written motion, and concluded that he did not
believe his trial counsel was prepared for trial and said that he thought trial counsel conspired
with the prosecution to give him a less than satisfying representation. (Tr., p.151, L.14 – p.152,
L.9.) The district court asked Mr. Nelson if he had any evidence to support the last allegation
and then summarized Mr. Nelson’s concerns by saying, “basically you’re dissatisfied with
[counsel’s] representation?” (Tr., p.152, Ls.10-21.) The court advised Mr. Nelson that it was
not a post-conviction proceeding so he wouldn’t necessarily decide the ineffective assistance of
counsel issues, then asked Mr. Nelson if he was claiming that counsel “isn’t properly prepared
for sentencing at this point?” (Tr., p.152, L.23 – p.153, L.16.) Mr. Nelson simply replied that he
did not believe counsel “has his best interests at heart.” (Tr., p.153, Ls.17-18.)
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The district court stated that the standard was whether the attorney-client relationship was
irretrievably broken, then asked defense counsel what he thought.

(Tr., p.153, Ls.21-23.)

Defense counsel said, “I don’t believe so, I think we should proceed to sentencing, and if he feels
his claims uphold post-conviction, he can take that appropriate route.” (Tr., p.153, L.24 – p.154,
L.1.) The court again asked Mr. Nelson if his counsel had “told you that he’s not going to help
you?” (Tr., p.154, Ls.2-3.) To which Mr. Nelson told the court that his counsel told him that he
would do what Mr. Nelson asked him to do but then he would just not do it, thus, Mr. Nelson had
no faith that his counsel would do anything he asked, and concluded that he “just ha[d] no faith
in him whatsoever.” (Tr., p.154, Ls.4-12.)
The court explained what choices a defendant had regarding obtaining counsel, and held:
The standard that, as I understand it, is not just dissatisfaction, it is whether the
attorney-client relationship is irretrievably broken. Mr. Nelson, I’ve had many of
these cases, and there are some cases where I have replaced attorneys because
people just can’t get along. It’s really obvious. And I understand there is a level
of tension between you and Mr. Williams, okay? And I understand you don’t like
what he’s done. We can’t undo what happened in that trial, okay? And I say that
in terms of you’ve been convicted, you’re going to sentencing. Now, whether
something changes somewhere down the road, but it’s not going to change
between now and, you know, the 27th.
We’re going to go through the sentencing process. You’re going to get to look at
the presentence report. I don’t know whether there’s evidence to be presented at
sentencing in favor of, we’ll call it mitigation, I don’t know. That’s certainly
something you two have the right to talk about, but I don’t think the law requires
that just because you’re not happy with your attorney, that you get to change, and
I am not going to appoint a new attorney at this stage until I am satisfied that the
attorney-client relationship is irretrievably broken. I don’t think -- it’s no good,
and I understand that, but there’s a difference between that and Mr. Williams is
not doing what he’s supposed to do, you know.
I’m not here to protect the interests of any lawyer, okay? Really, I’m not. I have
attorneys that practice in this court that do extremely good jobs, and I have
attorneys that practice before this court that do very bad jobs, I’ve seen it all, and I
have never known Mr. Williams to sell his clients down the river, so to speak. He
certainly is not in a conspiracy with the prosecutor’s office in this town. I
understand why you might think that, but that’s just not true, and I’m not going to
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make that kind of a finding. He advocates for his clients, and I don’t know what’s
going to happen at sentencing, what you’ve got in mind, but I think you can either
accept his representation or go to the other two choices. I’m not going to change
counsel at this point, okay?
(Tr., p.155, L.10 – p.156, L.21.)
However, this decision failed to address all of the concerns raised by Mr. Nelson.
Specifically, Mr. Nelson had set forth in his motion that “[t]here was a complete breakdown in
communication” between he and Mr. Nelson, where trial counsel was only responding to 5% of
what Mr. Nelson communicated to him. (R., p.181.) If this was true, the relationship between
Mr. Nelson and his counsel would almost certainly be “irretrievably broken,” because
Mr. Nelson would be unable to communicate to his counsel the essential mitigating information
and witnesses to be used at his sentencing hearing. Yet the court did not question either
Mr. Nelson or his counsel about whether they were able to communicate. Further, the district
court did not address Mr. Nelson’s concerns that his attorney was “not exhibiting sufficient
investigatory measures.” (R., p.181.) Although Mr. Nelson gave as an example his counsel’s
failure to get an accurate measure of the distance between the officer peeping in the window and
where Mr. Nelson was located in the apartment, this allegation certainly affects whether defense
counsel fully investigated any mitigating information Mr. Nelson would provide him with for
sentencing. However, the district court did not address this contention at all.
The lack of analysis by the district court is strikingly similar to the district court’s process
in Nath. In Nath, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to conduct the
mandated inquiry upon the defendant’s request for substitute counsel. Nath, 137 Idaho at 714715. The defendant in Nath requested substitute counsel due to the fact that trial counsel had
failed to investigate certain potential witnesses and failed to obtain the documents requested by
the defendant. Id. In response, the district court did not review the totality of the defendant’s
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claims but merely characterized the defendant’s dissatisfactions with counsel as a complaint that
his trial counsel was not following the defendant’s requests and instructions. Id. Because the
trial court did not provide the defendant an adequate opportunity to explain his reasons for
seeking substitute counsel, and because the trial court’s “review of this motion did not
encompass the totality of [the defendant’s] claims,” the Court in Nath held that the trial court
failed to provide the defendant with the required full and fair hearing on his request. Id.
Here, just as in Nath, the district court conducted an incomplete assessment of the request
and apparently failed to understand the totality of Mr. Nelson’s claims. Further, these claims, if
true, would certainly have affected Mr. Nelson’s ability to prepare for and present mitigating
evidence or information at his sentencing hearing.

Yet the court failed to inquire with

Mr. Nelson as to all of the claims he was asserting and failed to inquire of trial counsel as to the
merits of these claims. Mr. Nelson asserts that the district court failed to conduct the full and fair
hearing required by law upon his request for substitute counsel, and that a remand of his case is
therefore appropriate so that the trial court may properly determine whether there exists good
cause for the appointment of substitute counsel.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment and
order of commitment, reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress, and reverse the
order which denied his motion for substitute counsel and remand for a hearing.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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